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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
ASSIGNMENTS-ASSIGNMENT OF AN' EXPEcTANCY.-J oseph and James were 
two of six children. A contract wioiessed "that Joseph Snyder has sold to 
James Sny~er one undivided sixth of the real estate owned by the mother, 
Susan Snyder; to secure said interest to James after her death, the mother 
unites in the conveyance of said interest. The said Joseph warrants and 
defends the interest from all claims." The contract was signed by Joseph 
and by the mother. Held, Joseph had no estate which he could convey, and 
the contract, though made with the consent of the mother, was unenforce-
able either in law or in equity as against him. But the contract, though 
joined in by Joseph, who had no interest, was effective as a conveyance to 
James by the mother of a one-sixth interest of her estate in remainder. 
Joseph should be allowed to share equally with the others in the remaining 
five-sixths of the estate, after deducting the consideration money paid to 
him, which should be considered as an advancement." Snyder v. Snyder 
(Ky., I92I), 235 S. W. 743· 
At common law, "if a son bargain and sell the inheritance of his father, 
this. is void, because he hath no right in himself." Co. Litt. 265. The more 
general rule in equity is that the transaction will be enforced against the 
heir as a contract to convey as soon as the title of the heir becomes absolute, 
1f the contract is supported by ~ fair consideration. Whelm v. Phillips, I5I 
Pa. 3I2; Crum v. Sawyer, I32 Ill. 443; Pierce v. Robinson, I3 Cal. I23. 
Several jurisdictions hold that equity will not enforce the transaction unless 
it be entered into with the assent of the parent. The reason given is that 
it is a fraud on the parent who, if he had known that his property was 
going to a stranger, might have disp~sed of it in some other way. M cClttre 
v. Rabe1i, I33 Ind. 507; Bo31nton v. H1tbbard, 7 Mass. II2; Alves v. Schles· 
inger, 8I Ky. 29I. Equity may give effect to the transaction if based merely 
upon a quit-claim deed. Clendening v. Wyatt, 54 Kans. 523. If the deed 
is a warranty deed, a much stronger case is presented and the heir is 
estopped, as against his grantee, to claim the interest which he subsequently 
acquires. Bank v. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. 528; Steele v. Frierso1i, 85 Tenn. 
430. The principal case, where the contract was based on a fair considera-
tion, assented to by the parent, and warranted by the expectant heir, is as 
strong a case as there could be for giving effect to the intended transfer 
by Joseph to James; yet the majority of the court held that, as between 
them, nothing passed. A well-reasoned dissenting opinion argues that the 
transaction should be considered as a conveyance by the mother of a one-
sixth interest in her estate to Joseph and a conveyance of this by him to 
James, thus giving effect to the intention of the parties and doing justice 
to the other four children with whom Joseph is allowed to share under the 
majority opinion. Would it not be still better for Kentucky to go one step 
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farther than the principle contended for in the dissenting opinion, and adopt 
the more general equity rule, directly giving effect to the contract for the 
transfer of an expectancy, so long as it has been entered into fairly? 
CARRI£RS-BAGGAGE-UNNEcESSARY FoR. PASSENGER 'to TRAVEL oN TicKJW. 
-P purchased a ticket for passage on D's railroad from Addyston to Cin-
cinnati. From the latter place she could take D's through train, which did 
not stop at Addyston, to her destination in Michigan. She. checked her 
trunk in the evening, intending herself to follow the next morning. It 
being more convenient, however, to take an interurban to Cincinnati, she 
did this and destroyed the ticket for passage on D's road. At Cincinnati 
she bought a ticket over D's road to Michigan. On arrival at her destina-
tion it was discovered that her trunk had been stolen from D's station at 
Addyston on the preceding evening. In a suit by P it was held, that when 
she purchased the ticket over D's road and checked her trunk the relation 
was in effect that of passenger and carrier, and D was liable as an insurer 
for the subsequent loss, though P did not travel on her ticket. Caine v. 
Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (Mich., I92I), I85 N. W. 765. 
The rule upheld by the earlier cases on this subject seems to have been 
that the passenger must accompany his baggage. The Elvira Harbeck, 2 
Blatchf. 336; Graffam v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 67 Me. 234; 3 Hu'tCHIN-
SON, CARRIERS (Ed. 3), -§ I275· "Baggage implies a passenger who intends 
to go upon the train with his baggage." Marshall v. Po1~tiac, 0. & N. R. 
Co., I26 Mich. 45, 55 L. R. A. 650. In that case one purchased a ticket for 
the sole purpose of checking his baggage, later selling the ticket, and it was 
held that the railroad was only liable as a gratuitous bailee. The holding 
was not free from criticism, and though approved and followed by some 
courts-Perry v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., I7I N. C. IS8; Carlisle v. 
Grand Tnmk R. W. Co., 25 Ont. L. Rep. 372; Wood v. M. C.R. R. Co., 
98 Me. g8--it was disapproved and repudiated by others-M cKibbin v. Wis-
consin C. R. Co., IOO Minn. 270; Alabama Gt. Southeni R. Co. v. Kno.1:, I84 
Ala. 485, I2 MICH. L. Rev. 409. See also Larned v. Cmtral R. Co., Sr N. ]. 
L. 571, 9 MICH. L. Rev. 707. In the principal case the question arose for 
the first time in Michigan since the decision of the Marshall case twenty 
years before. Four justices undertook to distinguish the cases on the ground 
that in the Marshall case the loss occurred at the destination, the plaintiff 
not being there to receive the baggage, while in the principal case the loss 
at the point where the trunk was accepted, the plaintiff being ready at the 
destination to receive it; and on the further ground that in the Marshall <> 
case the plaintiff intended to deceive the railroad as to his riding on its 
train, while here there was no evidence of deception. Four justices con-
sidered the Marshall case as squarely overruled. The cases might have 
been further distinguished on the ground that in the Marshall case the 
plaintiff had sold his ticket and was having his baggage carried without 
cost to himself, while here the plaintiff destroyed her ticket and was fully 
paying- the railroad for its service in transporting her baggage. Under 
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the old methods of transportation there was some reason for saying that a 
passenger must accompany his baggage so that he might look after it in 
case of emergency or immediately claim it on his arrival at his destination. 
But in modern times the reasons for the old rule no longer apply. Baggage 
is in the exclusive control of the carrier and is often not even carried on 
passenger trains. The carrying of baggage is no longer a matter of grace, 
but is a distinct duty of the carrier, and a ticket entitles the purchaser not 
only to be carried but to have his baggage carried as well. Having paid both 
privileges, it is difficult to see why the buyer must avail himself of both to 
have the benefit of one. See 1Alabama Gt. Southern R. Co. v. Knox, supra. 
CoNTRACTs~AGENCY-Is AUTHORIZATION To S!lr;r, LAND ON CoMMrssroN 
A MERE R.EvocABLE OFFJ>R.-Action for breach of contract: P (a broker) 
alleged as the basis of the contract that he had received from D a written 
instrument giving him "exclusive sale" of certain property, and that he 
had spent time and money in reasonable efforts to procure a purchaser. The 
instrument in question was entitled a "contract" in its head-note, but it was 
simply an exclusive authorization to sell on commission basis (no time limit 
set), and was signed solely by D. Held, facts sufficiently set out a contract. 
Harriso1i v. lYfcPherso1i (Conn., 1922), II5 Atl. 723. 
The court regarded the instrument as an offer of employment, and the 
work and expense undergone in reliance thereon as an acceptance. The 
propriety of the holding must depend upon what sort of a contract and 
acceptance the offer contemplated. If it merely contemplated a unilateral 
contract to pay a certain commission in case P produced a purchaser, then 
there was no contract formed for lack of both acceptance and consideration. 
But the offer might in substance and effect, even though not expressly, be 
to pay a certain commission in case of sale if the broker put the property 
en his books or in his lists or advertisements, etc. Here also the offer 
would contemplate a unilateral contract, but the act of acceptance would 
be the preliminary work of listing the property, or doing whatever else the 
offer called for. If the instant case had been decided on the construction 
of the particular offer involved, we might question the validity of the court's 
construction, but not of the law laid down. In this event it would simply 
be in line 'with the strong desire courts in general seem to manifest in 
working out a valid contractual basis in these brokerage cases. Goward v. 
Waters, g8 Mass. 59(5; Attix v. Phelan, 5 Iowa 336; Axe v. Tolbert, I79' 
Mich. 556; Rowa1i v . . H11ll, 55 W. Va. 335. It does not appear, however, 
• that the court put its decision upon the construction of the particular offer 
made by this defendant. Apparently the court lays down the broad rule 
that where an authority to sell on commission is given, and the offeree makes 
a reasonable effort to procure a purchaser and spends time and money in 
so doing, there is a contract formed that requires the offer of commission 
to be kept open for the time stipulated, or, if none is stipulated, for a rea-
sonable time. The exact basis and nature of this contract is not clear. It 
certainly is somewhat difficult to square with the general theory governing 
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offers to unilateral contracts, and a recent New Jersey· case emphatically 
repudiates it. Ettinger v. Loux, II5 Atl. 384 The court in the latter case 
insists that such an authority is merely an offer toward a unilateral con-
tract, to be accepted by finding a purchaser, and subject to revocation like 
any other simple offer prior to acceptance by performance. of the act contem-
plated. But so extensive is this solicitude for the broker that: what we might 
term the "mere assumption" of the existence of a contract is not altogether 
uncommon in these cases. Gregory v. Bon11ey, 135 Cal. 589; Harrison v. 
A11gerson, II5 Ill. App. 226 (a case almost identical with Ettinger v. Loiex, 
supra); Hartford v. McGillicudy, 103 Me. 224; Hartwick v. Marsh, g6 Ark. 
23; Black v. Snook, 204 Pa. u9. It is probably but another illustration of 
the gro\~ing inclination to restrict the offeror's right to revoke in these cases, 
by treating it as a bilateral contract and the offeree's commencement of per-
formance as the counter promise, Rowaii v. Hi,ll, siepra; Lapron v. Flint, 
86 Minn. 376, semble (compare argument in Offord v. Davies, 12 C. B. N. S. 
748) ; or by implying in effect a collateral offer to keep the principal offer 
open, whenever the act of acceptance required by the latter will necessarily -
involve time and expense for its performance. Jaekel v. Caldwell, 156 Pa. 
266; Dodge v. Childers, 167 Mo. App. 448. Professor McGovney advances 
this latter theory with considerable plausibility in an article in 27 HARV. L. 
R.Ev. 654 and Sir Frederick Pollock, in 28 LAw QUARTERLY R.Ev. IOI, main-
tains strenuously that the right of revocation in these cases ought not as a 
matter of principle, and does not as a matter of fact, exist. Sir Frederick 
answers the objection of logical difficulties by insisting that "law exists for 
the convenience of mankind, not for the training of logicians." Excellent 
discussions of the problem appear in 26 YALE L. J. 193-196; WILLIS'tON ON 
CONTRACTS, § 60, and MitcHEM ON AGENCY (with reference to brokerage 
cases), § 2451 et seq. 
CoNTRACTs-lND!WINlTE W AIV!tR oF STATUTE oF LIMI'l'A'l'lONs.-Plaintiff 
executed his promissory note with a provision waiving all his rights under 
the statute of limitations. After the lapse of the statutory period from the 
maturity of the note, the defendant brought suit and recovered judgment. 
In an action to set the judgment aside, held, the provision waiving the stat-
ute, since it was for an indefinite time, was void. First National Bank v. 
Mock (Colo., 1922), 203 Pac. 272. 
Whether or not an agreement to waive the benefit of the statute of lim-
itations is valid is in dispute. Those courts which hold that such an agree-
ment is void do so on the ground that the statute of limitations, being a 
statute of repose, is essential to the security of all men, and that it would 
be contrary to public policy to allow parties to waive: its benefits. Wright 
v. Gardner, 98 Ky. 454; Crane v. French, 38 Miss. 503; Ann. Gas. 1916 A 686. 
On the other hand, the courts which hold that such an agreement is valid 
say that no principle of public policy is violated because the statute of lim-
itations was designed for the benefit of the debtor, and if he wishes to 
contract away this privilege he may do so. Parschen v. Chessma1i, 49 Mont. 
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326; Quick v. Corlies, 39 N. J. L. II; State Trust Co. v. Sheldoit, 68 Vt. 259. 
In those jurisdictions in which it is held that such an agreement does not 
contravene public policy the question has arisen as to the length of time 
for which a waiver, indefinite in terms, is operative. In Maim v. Cooper, 
2 App. Cas. (D. C.) 226, and State Trust Co. v. Sheldon, supra, it is held 
that a waiver for an indefinite time operates to remove the bar of the 
statute permanently. Other cases hold that such a waiver is effective only 
for a reasonable time after the statute has run,-to at least for a period 
equal to that provided by the statute relating to the cause of action in 
question. Parschen v. Chessmai~, supra. The more common rule is to treat 
such an agreement as operative for the same term as it would be if it were 
a new promise to pay the debt. See l WII.LISTON ON CoN'tRAC'l'S, 376. Such 
a rule would not, however, extend the time at all if the waiver were a part 
of the original transaction. 
CoN'tRAC'l's-S1umCE AS AccSP'.l'ANCE oF AN OFFSR.-Defendant company 
issued a life insurance policy to one B, naming the plaintiff as beneficiary. 
B allowed the policy to lapse by failing to pay the second premium. Agents 
of the defendant company solicited reinstatement and obtained the signa-
ture of B to an application and a note for the premium, giving him assur-
ance at the time that upon receipt of his note and application the company 
would reinstate the policy. The note and application were then sent in to 
the actuary of the company, who later returned the note to the agent, stating 
that it could not be received in payment. B was not notified and the note 
was not returned to him. He died six weeks later and plaintiff brought 
action on the policy. Held, that the agent's failure to return the note and 
communicate the rejection amounted to an assent to the reinstatement appli-
cation. Lechler v. Montana Life Ins. Co. (N. D., 1921), 186 N. W. 271. 
It is generally held that an offeree has a right to make no reply to offers, 
and that his silence and inaction cannot be construed as an assent to the 
offer. This is true even though the offer states that silence will be taken 
as consent, for the offerer cannot prescribe conditions of rejections so as 
to turn silence on the part of the offeree into acceptance. Beach v. U. S., 
226 U. S. 243; Royal Ins. Co. v. Beatty, n9 Pa. 6; Prescott v. Jones, 69 
N. H. 305; Grice v. Noble, 59 Mich. 515. Silence or inaction, however, 
may amount to assent to an offer for a unilateral contract, where the offer 
calls for inaction on the part of the offeree. See WILLISTON ON CoN'tRAC'l'S, 
§ 135. Where the offer contemplates a bilateral contract the courts look 
upon the situation somewhat differently. But even in this class of cases 
there may be situ·ations in which the relations between the parties have been 
such as to justify the offerer in expecting a reply, so that the offeree's silence 
will be considered to be an acceptance. Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip Co., 158 
Mass. 194; House v. Beak, 141 Ill. 290; Emery v. Cob,bey, 27 Neb. 621; 
Orme v. Cooper, l Ind. App. 449; Cole-Mcintyre-Norfleet Co. v. Holloway, 
214 S. W. 817. So, also, where the offeree has come under a duty to return 
money or property in his possession belonging to the offerer, or to accept 
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an offer for its purchase, silence and failure to return the property will 
amount to an assent to buy it Wheeler v. Klaholt, 178 Mass. 141; T11mer 
v. Machine & F. Co., 97 Mich. 166; Butler v. School Dist., 149 Pa. St. 351. 
Acceptance may also be inferred from silence where goods are sent to 
another without request and are used and dealt with as his own. A com-
mon illustration of this is where newspapers and periodicals are sent to one 
who has not subscribed to them or whose subscription has ceased. Austin 
v. Burge, 156 Mo. App. 286; Fogg v. Portsmouth Atheneum, 44 N. H. ns; 
Goodland v. Leclair, 78 Wis. 176. Under the circumstances of the principal 
case the court was justified in holding that there was a duty to notify the 
policyholder of the rejection and that a failure to do so amounted to an 
acceptance of the application. 
CRIMES-Ex'l'RADI'l'ION-EFFEC'l' OF ILLEGAL DEPOR'l'A'l'ION.-The petitioner 
was convicted of manslaughter in Oklahoma and fled to Mexico. He was 
illegally ejected by lVIexican officials and was immediately arrested and placed 
in confinement in California. Habeas corpus proceedings being begun, the 
petitioner contended that he was not subject to arrest and extradition because 
United States and Mexican officials had conspired to bring him into Cali-
fornia, and had done so without complying with the deportation laws of 
Mexico. Held: Had the United States officials conspired to bring the pris-
oner within the limits of the United States, he would not be subject to 
arrest, but as the evidence did not show this the petitioner was properly 
held, regardless of any irregularities committed by Mexican officials. In 1"e 
Jones (Cal., 1921), 201 Pac. 944. 
The rule as laid down in the principal case that irregularities of a sur-
rendering state alone are immaterial seems to be without conflict in the 
cases. E;; parte Wilson, 63 Tex. Crim. 281. But the dictum to the effect 
that if the state in which the crime was committed participated in those 
irregularities, and jurisdiction was obtained by force or fraud, the offender 
wouid not be deemed within the state, is not in accord with the majority 
of cases. The general rule is that a court trying a person for a crime com-
mitted within its jurisdiction will not investigate the manner of his capture 
in case he has fled to a foreign country and has been returned to the juris-
diction. £;; parte Barker, 87 Ala. 4; Ker v. Illinois, II9 U. S. 436; Klingen 
v. Kelly, 3 Wyo. 566. These cases proceed upon the theory that the only 
question before the court is that of the defendant's guilt. That if any wrong 
has been committed it is a wrong against the state from which he was ille-
gally taken, and those guilty must answer to the party aggrieved, which is 
not the defendant. A few courts have held, however, that where the officers 
of a state in which a crime has been committed have invaded the sovereignty 
of another state, and have wrongfully brought the offender back, the state 
acquires no jurisdiction. State v. Simmons, 39 Kans. 262; In re Robinson, 
29 Neb. 135· These courts justify their conclusion upon the grounds of 
public policy. The court in State v. Simmons, supra, said: "Not only would 
the special wrong be committed against the individual, but it would be a 
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general wrong· to society itself-a violation of those fundamental principles 
of mutual trust and confidence which lie at the very foundation of all organ-
ized society, and which are necessary in the very nature of things to hold 
society together." 
Cru:M1'S-MANSLAUGH'tER AS RJtsUL'l' OF AN Ac::r MALUM PROHIBI'l'UM 
ONLY.-Defendant, apparently through failure of service brake, lost con-
trol over the speed of his automobile on a steep down-grade. In passing 
a street car letting off passengers at the foot of the grade, defendant's auto-
mobile, then traveling at an estimated speed of 35 to 40 miles per hour, 
struck and killed deceased. Defendant was convicted of involuntary man-
slaughter and appealed. The judgment on the counts based on the com-
mission of an unlawful act was reversed because of the unconstitutionality 
of certain statutes and a defect in the indictment, and it was held reversible 
error for the judge to omit to charge the jury, without request, the law 
relating to the crime of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a 
lawful act without due caution. McDonald v. State (Ga., 1921), 109 S. E. 656. 
The general rule is that the unlawful act must be mafam ii~ se, and not 
merely malmn prohibitmn, in order to sustain a conviction for involuntary 
manslaughter. 21 CYc. 765; Com. v. Adams, II4 Mass. 323; State v. Horto1i, 
139 N. C. 588. Convictions for manslaughter based upon violations of laws 
regulating speed and establishing traffic rules are, however, becoming increas-
. ingly common, and this class of cases may be said to form a now well-
recognized exception. State v. Rountree, 181 N. C. 535; State v. M clvor . 
(Del., 1920), III Atl. 616; Madding v. State: u8 Ark. 5o6; People v. Cam-
beris, 297 Ill. 455. · "It is, however, practically agreed, without regard to 
this distinction, that if the act is a violation of a statute intended and 
designed to prevent injury to the person, and is in itself dangerous and 
death "ensues, that the person violating the statute is guilty of manslaughter 
at least, and under certain circumstances of murder." State v. M elver, 175 
N. C. 76!. Where the defendant is not exceeding the speed limit, or that 
fact is in doubt, it is generally held that, to be criminally liable, he must 
have .been guilty of gross or wanton negligence. People v. Adams, 289 Ill. 
339; State v. Long, 30 Del. 397, which was the proximate cause of the death. 
Dunville v. State, 188 Ind. 373. As suggested in State v. Mclver, supra, the 
basis for the recognition of this exception is public policy, in view of the 
constant danger to travelers on the highways from the ever increasing auto-
mobile traffic. It is to be noted that the facts in the instant case are unusual, 
and if the jury should find the defendant not guilty under instructions as 
to the crime of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act 
without due caution, it is doubtful if he could properly be convicted under 
the other counts. 
EQUI'l'Y-CANC1'LLA'l'ION B1'CAUSS OF MIS'l'AKE.-The defendant, who was 
the owner of the majority of the stock in the Banker's Trust Company, 
entered into a contract to sell his holdings to the plaintiff. Subsequently 
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a shortage of $17,000 was discovered in the assets of the company, due to 
the defalcation of a bookkeeper. This shortage, which had been concealed 
by false entries in the books, materially reduced the value of the stock. The 
plaintiff thereupon sued for cancellation of the contract on the ground of 
mutual mistake as to the assets. Held, since there was a clear case of bona 
fide mistake regarding material facts, without culpable negligence on the 
part of the person complaining, there is such mistake as to warrant a decree 
of cancellation. Lindberg v. M1trray (Wash., 1!)21), 201 Pac. 759. 
The parties were mistaken as to the facts creating the inducement to 
contract. An error, and possibly a material one, was made as to the facts 
which determined the value of the shares. Such an error is usually termed 
a mistake as to collateral matter to distinguish it from a mistake as to the 
identity or existence of the subject matter of the sale. To determine 
whether or not such a mistake should have the legal effect of justifying 
cancellation, the Washington court declared that. "the true test in cases 
involving mutual mistake of fact is whether the contract would have been 
entered into had there been no mistake." This test is far more comprehen-
sive than that generally accepted by courts of equity in such cases. In dis-
cussing the legal effect of various kinds of mistake, the New York court 
has said : "There are many extrinsic facts surrounding every business trans-
action which have an important bearing and influence upon its results. * * * 
In such cases, if a court of equity could intervene and grant relief because 
a party was mistaken as to such a fact as would nave prevented him from 
entering the transaction if he had known the truth, there would be such 
uncertainty and instability in contracts as to lead to much embarrassment." 
Dambmaim v. Schulting, 75 N. Y. 55. Influenced by these considerations, 
the Minnesota court in the recent case of Costello v. Sykes, 143 Minn. 109, 
on facts almost identical to those of the principal case, refused to cancel 
the contract, saying: "A mistake relating merely to the attributes, quality 
or value of the subject of a sale does not warrant rescission." This view 
is quite the antithesis of that of the principal case, and, if strictly adhered 
to, would be nearly as objectionable. That a mistake as to quality or value 
will, in fact, warrant cancellation, at least in extraordinary cases, is well 
illustrated by Sherwood v. W:alker, 66 Mich. 568. The most satisfactory 
solution of the problem involves taking a position somewhere between the 
two extremes above indicated. This middle ground is well expressed in the 
leading English case of Kennedy v. Panama, etc., Mail Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. 
580, where the court, in discussing the legal effect of mistake, said that the 
problem "in every case is to determine whether the mistake or misappre-
hension is as to the substance of the whole consideration, going, as it were, 
to the root of the matter, or only to some point, even though a material 
point, an error as to which does not affect the substance of the whole con-
sideration." In other words, a mistake should go to the very essence of 
the contract to justify cancellation by a court of equity. This is obviously 
quite different from a mere mistake as to a fact, a knowledge of which 
would have prevented the contract. Furthermore, the determination of the 
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question cannot be accomplished by the application of a geometrical test 
such as that suggested in the principal case, but, again to quote the words 
of the English court, it "must depend upon the construction of the contract 
and the particular circumstances of the particular case." According to 
Holmes, C. ]., in Dedhm1i Natl. Bank v. Everett Natl. Bank, 177 Mass. 392, 
"the ground of recovery * * * under a mistake of fact is that the existence 
0£ the fact supposed was the conventional basis or tacit condition of the 
transaction." The Washington court will be compelled to recede from its 
position in the principal case unless it intends to extend relief to a vast 
number of cases of mistake which have not been generally recognized as 
warranting the interposition of equity. 
EQUITY-INJUNCTION AGAINS't UsuRPA'tION oF OFFICER'S DuTms.-The 
charter of Oklahoma City vested the powers of city government in five 
comm1ss1oners. One provision of the charter placed the police department 
under the supervision of the mayor. Another provision authorized the 
commission by a vote of four to one to "transfer duties from, one commis-
sioner and from one department to, another commissioner and another depart-
ment." By such a vote the control of the police department was transferred 
from the mayor to the commissioner of accounting and finance. Upon a 
bill for an injunction, held, the charter could not be construed to empower 
the commissioners to make this transfer, and equity had jurisdiction to 
enjoin the assumption of authority over the police. , Walton v. Donnelly 
(Okla., I92I), 201 Pac. 367. -
The court drew attention to the fact that it was not called upon to 
determine the complainant's title to his office, and placed its decision upon 
the ground that there was no legal remedy, because information in the 
nature of quo warranto was confined to the determination of title to office, 
and could not be used to determine who should perform particular official 
duties. The scope of a q110 warranto proceeding is generally regarded as 
so limited. HIGH, ExTRAORDINARY LEGAr, REMEDIES, § 618. Q110 warranto 
was held not to be the proper remedy to prevent city officers from levying 
and collecting ta..xes beyond the city limits. People v. Whitcomb, 55 Ill. 172. 
Injunction and not quo warranto was held to be the proper remedy to pre-
vent the county tax collector from paying into the county treasury taxes 
levied upon city property. Sanderso1i v. Texarkana, 103 Ark. 529. In a 
recent case, however, a writ of prohibition was granted to prevent the 'Cir-
cuit court from assuming jurisdiction to grant an injunction to restrain the 
circuit judges from classifying the deputies in county offices, under a statute 
authorizing this, the injunction being asked upon the ground that the statute 
was unconstitutional. The reasons given were (I) that equity has no juris-
diction to restrain political acts; (2) the legal remedy by proceeding in quo 
warranto was available, because the statute giving the remedy of q110 war· 
ranto made it available to protect "franchises," and in its broad sense a 
franchise may include the right of a public officer to perform official duties 
as well as the rights of corporations. State v. Dawson (Mo., 1920), 224 
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S. \V. 824 An injunction was refused on the same ground in Cochraii v. 
McCleary, 22 Iowa 75. Equity will enjoin the ouster of an officer without 
a proper hearing at law, and, without trying the title to an office as between 
rival claimants, will protect its enjoyment. Kerr v. Trego, 47 Pa. 292; see 
20 MICH. L. Rl>v. 238. But it is clear that in the principal case the court 
decided upon the disputed right of the complainant to e.'i:ercise certain duties 
claimed as appurtenant to his office, and the assumption of jurisdiction as 
to this political question can be justified, in view of equity's traditional atti-
tude toward political questions, only upon the ground given· that the legal 
remedy of quo warranto is not available for the purpose. 
EQUITY-UNCONSCIONABI.~ CONTRACT CANC~tn.-The plaintiff had a 
deposit in a trust company of $22,500, of which he had lost all recollection 
because of an illness which had resulted in a loss of memory. A company 
official who knew of the plaintiff's mental condition, and alsc, by reason of 
his connection with the company, of the deposit, concealed from the plaintiff 
his official connection and induced him to contract to pay nearly one-half 
of the sum as consideration for revealing its whereabouts. Later the plain-
tiff sued for cancellation of the contract. There was no claim of mental 
incapacity to contract. Held, because of the abnormal condition of the 
plaintiff's mind, and also because of the semi-confidential position which 
the defendant occupied with respect to the plaintiff, equity would give the 
desired relief. Giertli v. Fidelity Trust Company (N. J., 1921), 115 At!. 3!)7· 
The case was well decided on either of the two bases suggested by the 
court. As to the effect of the plaintiff's mental condition, although there 
was no claim that he was mentally incompetent to contract, yet his illness 
had materially weakened his mental powers and impaired his power of self-
protection. In such cases, especially when coupled with inadequacy of con-
sideration, equity will give relief, even though neither the mental impair-
ment nor the inadequacy of consideration, standing alone, would suffice. 
Courts are particularly willing to refuse specific performance against a 
defendant so afflicted. Blackwilder v. Loveless, 21 Ala. 371. But it is also 
well settled that, in cases of sufficient hardship, affirmative relief by way o! 
cancellation will be given. M a1m v. B1ttterly, 21 Vt. 326; Maddox v. Sim-
11w11s, 31 Ga. 512. The decision in the principal case is warranted on this 
ground. The other ground suggested by the court, namely, the defendant's 
semi-confidential" position with respect to the plaintiff, pr!!sents more dif-
ficulty. The case is somewhat analogous to those cases in which the direc-
tors of corporations have purchased shares from non-official shareholders, 
either concealing their identity as directors or withholding information mate-
rial to the value of the shares. The earlier cases refused to recognize the 
"duty to disclose" under such circumstances. In 1847 Chief Justice Shaw 
said, "The directors are not the bailees, agents, factors, or trustees of the 
individual stockholders." Smith v. H1wd, 12 Met. (Mass.) 371. But in 
1904, in Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419, the Supreme Court, recognizing 
that the earlier rule opened the door to most inequitable impositions, decided 
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
that, "If it were conceded that the ordinary relations between directors and 
shareholders are not of such a fiduciary nature as to make it the duty of 
the director to disclose to the shareholder general knowledge which he pos-
sesses in regard to the shares before he purchases, yet there are cases where 
by reason of the special facts the duty does exist." A few cases of a still 
later date have gone even further and have held that there is a duty to dis-
close, though no "special facts'; exist. Dawso1i v. National Life Ins. Co., 
I76 Ia. 362. See 8 MICH. L. R.Ev. 267, and I9 MICH. L. R.Ev. 6g8. In the 
principal case the defendant's official connection with the trust company 
might well place him in the same semi-fiduciary position as that of the 
director, A state of facts somewhat similar to those of the principal case 
was presented in- Jones v. Stewart, 62 Neb. 207. The plaintiff had forgotten 
the existence of a certain bank deposit, and the defendant, who knew about 
it, though he was not connected with the bank, induced the plaintiff, as con-
sideration for the conveyance of some relatively worthless land, to assign 
the deposit to him by executing the necessary papers without reading them. 
When the plliintiff learned what he had done he sued the defendant in 
case for deceit: A decision for the defendant was predicated upon the 
fact that the parties had contracted on equal terms and that there was no 
-fiduciary relationship between them. The plaintiff's position was somewhat 
weaker than that of the plaintiff in the principal case because there was no 
evidence of an abnormal mental condition, nor was the defendant connected 
in any way with the bank. So, in spite of the imposition on the plaintiff 
which would have made a decree granting relief seem equitable, the two 
cases may be distinguished. 
EvIDENc:E-CHARACTER WITNESSES IN SUPPORT OF VERACITY.-Testimony 
of the accused, who was his own_ witness in a trial for robbery, was directly 
contradictory to the testimony of a witness for the state. Held, accused 
was entitled to support his evidence by calling character witnesses to sus-
tain his general reputation for truth and veracity. Smith v. State (Okla. 
Cr. App., I922), 202 Pac. 1046. 
The court takes the broad stand that when the veracity of the witness 
is in any mamier called into question character witnesses in support of same 
may be introduced. The only authorities cited are three prior decisions 
by the same court, Friel v. State, 6 Okla. Cr. 532; Gilbert v. State, 8 Okla. 
Cr. 329; Davidson v. State, I5 Okla. Cr. 85; and in only one of the three (Gil-
bert v. State) is the question directly raised and discussed. None of these 
cases discuss the earlier contra holding by the supreme court of the state, 
which at that time was the court of last resort in criminal as well as in 
civil appeals. First National Bank v. Blakeman, 19 Okla. Io6. This may 
result in having one rule enforced in criminal cases and another in civil 
o cases. As a general rule, however, no such distinction is recognized. There 
certainly is no logical basis for it. The same objections so clearly pointed 
out in Tedens v. Sclmmers, !I2 Ill. 263, 266, apply in both cases, viz., that 
the trial would become interminable, and the main issues befogged perhaps 
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by the large number of side issues with respect to the veracity of witnesses. 
The cogency of these objections has determined the issue in all but a very 
few jurisdictions. Gertz v. Fitchburg R. Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78; Farr v. 
Thompso1~, Cheves (S. C.) 37; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. M'Clish, 115 Fed. 
268; Texas & P.R. Co. v. Raney, 86 Tex. 363; Jacobs v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. 
353. [A very recent Te.'\:as decision in a civil action is in accord with the 
principal case. Davis v. Hudson, 135 S. W. 1107. The earlier Texas view, 
however, is with the general rule; and since the later case was not in the 
court of last resort, nor the point discussed, its weight would appear to be 
negligible.] But in at least one jurisdiction following the general rule the 
courts have permitted exceptions under special circumstances. State v. 
DeWolf, 8 Conn. 92; Merriam v. Hartford & N. H. R. Co., 20 Conn. 354-
And perhaps with perfect consistency with the spirit and reasons for the 
rule, an exception might be made where the accused in a criminal trial is a 
witness in his own behalf. When the crime charged involves any moral tur-
pitude the very fact that the accused is being tried for such a crime involves 
a direct and serious attack upon his credibility as a witness, and evidence 
of his reputation for veracity might properly be admissible. But see Spurr 
v. U. S., 87 Fed. 701, 713, contra. 
~ 
Evrmmce-fus GESTAJ;.-In a trial for murder the statement by the 
deceased that "a stranger shot (him)," made in reply to a question by a 
police official, was admitted in evidence. It appeared that the statement was 
made immediately after the deceased recovered his speech, although about 
thirty minutes had elapsed since the shooting. Upon appeal, it was held 
admissible as part of the res gestae. Commonwealth v. Pimtario (Penn., 
i922), II5 Atl. 831. 
The instant case is supposed to be representative of an exception to the 
hearsay rule which Mr. Wigmore confesses to approach "with a feeling akin 
to despair." 3 WIGMORS ON Ev., § 1745. That courts style such statements 
res gestae is not especially illuminating. The use of this phrase "is apt to 
lead to confusion with the Verbal Act doctrine under which extra-judicial 
statements are admissible to explain or give color to otherwise equivocal 
acts which they accompany, and so-called spontaneous statements which get 
their prob~tive value from the fact that the declarant is under some nervous 
shock and has very slight opportunity for fabrication. As to how nearly 
contemporaneous with the transaction to which it refers the statement must 
be no rule can be given. Kennedy v. R. Co., 130 N. Y. 654 Very much 
must be left to the discretion of the trial court. State v .. Ah Loi, 5 Nev. 101. 
That the declarant has been without the power of articulation in the mean-
time, as in the principal case, has often been deemed important. Lewis v. 
State, 29 Tex. A. 201 (one and a half hours); E.by v. Ins. Co., 258 Pa. 525 
(fifteen minutes or more). The reason for this is not altogether obvious, 
for inability to speak is apt to encourage premeditated rather than spon-
taneous statements after speech is regained. What the law distrusts is not 
after-speech but after-thought. Ins. Co. v. Sheppard; 85 Ga. 751; Green v. 
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State, 154 Ind. 655. ~ It is submitted that the statement in the instant case 
cannot be brought within the Verbal Act doctrine because the transaction to 
which it referred was completed and unequivocal; nor can it properly be 
treated as a spontaneous statement, because it appears to have been a delib-
erate answer to a question after the lapse of considerable time. .However, 
some of the authorities already cited support the decision. For an e..°'l:tensive 
note on the subject see 42 L. R. A. (n. s.) 198. 
FALSE IMPRISONllU<:NT-CONSENT AS A DtFENSE.-Defendants with others 
went to the house where the plaintiff was staying and forcibly entered. The 
plaintiff resisted at first, but was induced to go with the defendants, by 
whom he was taken to the state line. He was there assaulted. In an action 
for assault and battery and false imprisonment the court instructed the jury 
that the plaintiff could not recover for anything done prior to the assault, 
on the theory that the plaintiff had consented to everything done before that 
time. Held, the instruction was erroneous. Meints v. Hmitington, 276 
Fed. 245. 
The instruction was held to be erroneous not only because based on a 
conclusion of fact, the determinition of ·which should have been left to the 
jury, but also because it was an inaccurate statement of the law. It was 
held to be inaccurate on the theory that consent is no defense to an action 
for false imprisonment. The only cases cited to sustain this position were 
cases of assault and battery. As a general rule, in an action for assault 
and battery, if what is done amounts to a breach of the peace or is forbid-
den on public grounds, consent is no defense. Stout v. Wren, 8 N. C. 420; 
Shay v. Thompson, 59 Wis. 540; Morris v. Miller, 20 L. R. A. (n. s.), 907, 
note. It may, however, be shown in mitigation of damages. Barholt v. 
Wright, 45 Ohio St. 177. The theory is that the state is involved and there 
can be no defense based on a breach of the Jaw. COOLEY ON TORTS (Ed. 2) 
188. For a criticism of this rule and the reasons underlying it with respect 
to cases of mutual combat, see Galbraith v. Fleming, 60 Mich. 403; Smith 
v. Sim01~, 69 Mich. 481; Lykins v. Hamrick, 144 Ky. So. Conceding the 
soundness of the rule, it is of doubtful application in a case of false 
imprisonment, since the gist of the action is the detention of the plaintiff 
without his consent, and there is no legal wrong unless the detention was 
involuntary in the sense of being contrary to the will of the plaintiff. Con-
sent given before the alleged detention took place was held to· be a defense 
in the following cases: Moses v. Dubois (S. C.), Dudley 209; Houston & 
T. C. R. Co. v. Roberson, 138 S. W. 822; Ellis v. Cleveland, 54 Vt. 437. 
The result reached in the principal case is the correct one, but may be more 
properly based upon a proposition to which all authorities will agree, namely, 
that a detention sufficient to support an action for false imprisonment may 
arise despite submission if the circumstances are such as to induce an appre-
hension that force will be used. There is no obligation to incur the risk 
of personal violence by resisting until actual violence is used. Comer v. 
Knowles, 17 Kan. 436; ·Pike v. Hanson, 9 N. H. 491. That the court in the 
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principal case had in mind a submission to a show of force appears from 
its consideration of the evidence. To call a submission to a show of force 
consent is a misuse of terms, and the further statement that consent is no 
defense to an action of false imprisonment was unnecessary to the decision 
of the case and is not sustained by the authorities. 
lNJUNCTION-RlGH'l.' OF ATTORNEY TO CONSULT WITH Cr.IEN'J.' CONFINED IN 
JAII..-A cJ.ient of P, an attorney, was confined in a county jail. Notwith-
standing P's repeated efforts to see her, D, the sheriff in charge of the jail, 
arbitrarily refused to permit P to see or consult with her client. On a peti-
tion for an: injunction against D, the court held that an attorney has the 
, right to be allowed, without undue or arbitrary restraint, to consult with 
clients confined in a jail, and that an injunction may be granted to enforce 
the right. Wilma11s v. Harsto1~ (Tex., I92I), 234 S. W. 233. 
A person confined in jail clearly has the right to consult with his attor-
ney at reasonable times. State v. Davis, 9 Okla. Cr. Rep. 94; People v. 
Risely, I N. Y. Cr. Rep. 492; Hamilto1i v. State, 68 Tex. Cr. Rep. 419 (involv-
ing a statute). But see Ki11locli v. Harvey, II S. C. 326. It would seem 
that an attorney had a reciprocal right to see his client, and it has been so 
held. fa the Matter of the Sheriff, etc., I Wheeler Cr. Cas. (N. Y.) 303. 
The principal case clearly states this right, but the report does not show 
on what basis the court took jurisdiction to enforce the right by injunction. 
Assuming the general rule to be that injunctions are only granted when a 
right of property is involved (but see 29 HARV. L. Rev. 640), it would seem, 
nevertheless, that such a right was clearly present here. "The right of a 
citizen to pursue any calling, business, or profession he may choose is a 
property right to be guarded by equity as zealously as any other form of 
property." New Method La1t11dry Co. v. MacCa11it, I74 Cal. 26. An attor-
ney's right to his clientele and to carry on his profession is one of substance, 
and a direct violation of that right, like that in the principal case, would 
obviously result in a certain pecuniary loss to him. Equity may refuse to 
enjoin an injury to reputati'on only. Mead v. Stirling, 62 Conn. 586; litdso1i 
v. Zurhorst, 30 Ohio C. C. 9. But courts of equity have often gone much 
farther than the principal case in finding a property right on which to base 
their jurisdiction, as when the publication of private letters is restrained, 
Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanston's Rep. 402; Woolsey v. J11dd, 4 Duer (N. Y.) 
379; or a birth certificate cancelled. Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N. J. Eq. 
910. See also cases collected in note to Ex parte Badger, 14 A. L. R. 286. 
While the principal case seems to be without direct precedent, it is sub-
mitted that the holding is a correct one and is no departure from the estab-
lished fields of equity jurisdiction. 
!NJUNCTION-WASTE-BAI.ANCE OF lNJURY.-There was a devise of a 
portion of an estate to the defendant for life, with remainder to the heirs 
of his body, and if there should be no heirs of his body, remainder to the 
plaintiff. The defendant joined with his nine children in mortgaging the 
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premises to secure a loan, and proposed with them to dispose of a portion 
of their property to a subdividing company in order to raise sufficient money 
to discharge the mortgage and prevent the sale of the land on foreclosure. 
The plailltiff, who was a contingent remainderman, sought to enjoin the sale 
and subdivision of the property into building lots on the ground that it was 
waste, but it was held that equity would not enjoin. Brown v. BroWJi (W. 
Va., 1921), rn9 S. E. 815. 
It would seem that the court would have been justified in holding that 
the acts sought to be enjoined were of such an ameliorating nature as not 
to amount to waste. It was held not waste to raze a dwelling house when 
changes in the surroundings had made the premises more valuable as busi-
ness property. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7; see 19 MICH. L. 
Riw, ms. The court, however, assumed that these acts would be waste, and 
placed its decision upon two grounds: first, that the complainant's interest 
was not likely to vest, since it depended upon the double contingency of his 
surviving the defendant and the defendant surviving all of his nine children 
and their issue; secondly, that the hardship upon the defendant by granting 
the injunction would greatly exceed the hardship upon the complainant if 
it was refused, which, partly because of the remoteness of his property right, 
the court regarded as inconsequential. It appears settled that a contingent 
remainderman cannot maintain an action at law for waste. Hunt v. Hall, 
37 Me. 363; Taylor v. Adams, 93 Mo. App. 277; Latham v. Lmnber Co., 
139 N. C. 9. In equity it is held that one having a possibility of reverter, 
as upon the owners of the fee ceasing to use the land for church purposes, 
cannot obtain an injunction against waste. Dees v. Che11vronts, 240 Ill. 486. 
See also Curles et al. v. Wade, 151 Ga. 142; Mathews v. H1tdson, 81 Ga. 120. 
But although a contingent remainderman cannot succeed at law, he may 
obtain an injunctioii against waste. Where the life tenant committed waste 
by drilling for oil, it was said that while the contingent remainderman could 
not sue for damages nor bring a bill for accounting for past waste, he 
could enjoin future waste "for the protection of the inheritance which is 
certain, though the person on whom it may fall is uncertain." Ohio Oil Co. 
v. Daughetee, 240 Ill. 36!; see also Watson v. Wolff-Goldman Realty Co., 
95 Ark. 18. It would seem, therefore, that the fact that the complainant is 
a contingent remainderman should have no bearing on the decision in the 
principal case, e.."'\:cept as it leads the court to refuse to enjoin waste of a 
negligible nature in favor of one whose property interest is uncertain, and 
thereby impose a serious present loss on the defendants. The equities favor 
the defendant from the standpoint of hardship. But the doctrine of balance 
of injury has been generally confined to those cases where the injury to the 
defendant from an injunction would be very great, as where it involved 
the closing dovin of a lar&"e manufacturing plant, or where, under similar 
circumstances, the _suppressing of an important commodity vitally affected 
the interests of the public. And on principle the weight of authority is 
against the doctrine, because, justifying under the discretion of equity to 
grant or refuse an injunction, it determines the legality of claimed rights 
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in accordance with their value. See Po:M~OY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (Ed. 
2), §§ I943-I945; Hansen v. Cro11ch, g8 Ore, I4I. In Continental Fi1el Co. 
v. Haden, I82 Ky. 8, the court was asked to cancel a mining lease upon the 
ground that the lessees had committed waste by failing to operate the mines 
in a workmanlike manner. This was refused because the injury to com-
plainants was inconsequential as compared to the loss of $100,coo in mining 
machinery and equipment installed in the mine by the defendant. It is seen 
that this decision is in harmony with the distinction which has been drawn 
between the case where the complainant's injury is actually small and the 
case where his injury is clearly substantial but proportionately less than the 
injury to the defendant. The courts will more readily refuse an injunction 
upon balaneing injuries in the former case than in the latter. Campbell v. 
Seaman, 63 N. Y. 568. The technical or imponderable nature of the plain-
tiff's injury seems also to have been considered in Bliss v. Washoe Copper 
Co., 109 C. C. A I33· This factor was present in the principal case, since 
the beneficial character of the changed use of the property made the plain-
tiff's injury, if any, purely technical, and, together with the uncertainty of 
his ultimate property right, causes the result reached to appear preeminently 
just. It should be noted, however, that in the cases above referred to, and 
in those cited in POMEROY, S11pra, the plaintiff would have alternative recourse 
to a suit for damages at law, while in the principal case, as pointed out 
above, refusing an injunction leaves the plaintiff without a remedy. It is 
well, however, to confine the relief which equity grants to a contingent 
remainderman to those cases in which equitable considerations are more 
clearly in his favor. 
NEGUGtNCE-PARTY Gun.TY oF CoNTRIBU'.rORY N.EGI.IGENct AS MATTER oF 
LAW BtcAUSE STRUCK BY AuTOMOBII,t HAVING RIGHT oF WAY.-While cross-
ing a street at a speed of IS miles an hour the plaintiff was struck by the 
defendan~, who was coming along a cross street at 35 miles an hour and 
had the right of way by statute. Held, the plaintiff was guilty of contrib-
utory negligence as a matter of law. Anderso1i v. Jenny Motor Co. (Minn., 
I92I), 185 N. W. 378. 
The rule laid down in the principal case is taken from the Minnesota 
decision of Lendahl v. Morse, I8I N. W. 323, in which negligence in law is 
confused with negligence in fact. It is submitted that in the principal case 
Holt, J., takes the sounder view in his dissenting opinion when he says: 
"There are so many varied circumstances in every accident at a street cross-
ing that the question of whose fault it was should be determined by the 
triers of fact." He further points out that "under the rule of the Lindahl 
case an ox team could never cross a downtown street of Minneapolis, except 
possibly between 2 a. m. and 6 a. m., for some reckless speeders to the right 
of the team would surely be in time to hit the rear of the wagon, even if 
two blocks away when the team •first entered the intersection." Obviously, 
the whole matter of who was to blame for the accident should be left to the 
jury with proper instructions as to the law applicable to the circumstances. 
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Authority in other jurisdictions is uniformly against the holding in the prin-
cipal case. A driver having the right of way at a street crossing is not 
justified in plunging ahead regardless of consequences nor failing to exer-
cise ordinary care to avoid injury to others. Glatz v. Kroeger Bros. Co., 
168 \Vis. 635. "If we assume the defendant had the right of way the con-
ditions must be such as to justify him in the absolute exercise of the right. -
In any event, his right on the highway is not exclusive, but •at all times rel-
ative and still subject to the fundamental common law doctrine: Sic 1itere 
f!to ut alienmn non laedas." Paulse1i v. Kliiige, 92 N. J. L. 99. The right 
of precedence at a crossing has no application where one not having that 
right approaches the crossing and has no reasonable grounds for appre-
hending a collision because of the distance from the crossing of one having 
such right. Barnes v. Barnett, 184 Iowa 936. Furthermore, "the rule regard-
ing the right of way does not impose upon the person crossing the street 
the duty of assuming that the other will continue to cross an intersecting 
street without slowing down, as required by law." Whitelaw v. M cGilliard, 
179 Cal. 349. Perhaps in the principal case the fact was that the plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory negligence because of a failure to yield the 
defendant the right of way, but whether or not this was so should have 
been found as a matter of fact rather than as a matter of law. 
PsRJURY-ACQUI't'.L'AL OF CRIME CHARGED NO BAR TO SUBSEQUENT PROSE-
CUTION FOR PERJURY.-Defendant was convicted of perjury for giving false 
testimony at a previous trial in which he was acquitted of a charge of 
receiving stolen property. The conviction of perjury was inconsistent with 
the prior acquittal. Held, acquittal was no bar. People v. Niles (Ill., 1921), 
133 N. E. 252. 
The general rule is that acquittal on a criminal charge is no bar to a 
subsequent prosecution of the defendant for perjury. T_he cases of United 
States v. B1itler, 38 Fed. 4g8, and Cooper v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 909, 
to the contrary, have been seriously questioned and expressly overruled 
respectively by Alle1i v. United States, 194 Fed. 664 and Teague v. Com-
monwealth, 172 Ky. 665. In some cases it has been said that if the convic-
tion of perjury necessarily contradicts the previous acquittal, the latter is 
a bar. Chitwood v. United States, 178 Fed. 442; State v. Smith, 1i9 Minn. 
107. The logic of treating the matter as res judicata is somewhat impaired 
by recalling that the prior acquittal was essentially a failure to find the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt rather than a finding that he 
was not guilty. Thus, if an acquittal were held conclusive of the fact a 
fortiori, a conviction should have the same effect. Sound policy seems to 
require that a defendant taking the stand in his own behalf should not be 
able to perjure himself with utter impunity, nor should his immunity depend 
upon the convincingness with which he lies. For notes and citations of 
authorities see 39 L. R. A. (n. s.) 385; L. R. A. 1917 B 743. 
PuBI,Ic UTILITY CoRPORATIONS-RIGHT TO D!scoNTINUE SERVICE.-The O 
Company entered into a contract with a village to supply it with gas for ten 
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years. Its supply of gas failing, the 0 Company made a contract with the 
E Company for a supply of gas, the contract being subject to termination 
upon six months' notice by either party. By means of the gas thus obtained 
the 0 Company was enabled for a time to perform its contract with the 
village, but before the term of the contract had expired the E Company 
gave notice as required and discontinued its supply of gas to the 0 Com-
pany, when then applied to the Public Utilities Commission for permission 
to withdraw its gas service and facilities from the village. The E Company 
was made a party to the proceedings, but was dismissed on the ground that 
the commission could not compel it to supply gas to the village because there 
was no contractual obligation between the E Company and the village, 
though the charter of the E Company expressly authorized it to supply gas 
to the village in question. The 0 Company was given permission to with-
draw its service and facilities because of its inability to obtain gas. On 
appeal, the order of the commission was affirmed. Village of St. Clairsville 
v. Public Utilitiirs Comniission (Ohio, 1921), 132 N. E. 151. 
The right of a public utility corporation to discontinue its service seems 
uncontested, so far as the general public is concerned, when the corporation 
acts with the consent of the state. Jeffries v. Comnwnwealth, 121 Va. 425. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that, in the absence of statute 
or express contract a public service corporation has the right to discontinue 
its entire service when operations are being carried on at ai loss and without 
reasonable prospect of future profit. Brooks-Scanlo1i Company v. Railroad 
Commission of Louisiana, 251 U. S. 3g6; Bullock v. R. R. Comm. of Florida, 
254 U. S. 513. In the latter case the court said: "No implied contract that 
they will do so (operate at a loss) can be elicited from the mere fact that 
they have accepted a charter from the state and have been allowed to e."'>:er-
cise the power of eminent domain." Ac.cord, Lyon & Hoag v. Railroad 
Commission, 183 Cal. 145; New York Tmst Co. v. Buffalo & L. E. Trac. 
Co., 183 N. Y. Supp. 278. To compel operation in such cases would result 
in the taking of property without due process of law, in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Brooks-Scanlo1i Company v. Railroad Commission 
of Louisiana, supra. NaturaJly, the courts have not frequently passed upon 
the right of a solvent public utility corporation to discontinue its service 
entirely. In. support of such a right, see I WYMAN ON Pom.1c SERVICE CoR-
PORATIONS, §§ 290-313; Mmm v. Illinois, 94 U. S. n3; San Antonio Street 
Railway Co. v. Statir of Te%as, go Tex. 520; Gas Co. v. City, 81 Ohio St. 
33; Fellows v. Los Angeles, 151 Cal. 52. For opinions contra, see note, L. 
R. A. 1915 A 549; Southem Ry. Co. v. Hatchett, 174 Ky. 463. But where 
a public utility corporation discontinues its service as to part or all of its 
plant it renders its franchises liable to forfeiture. State v. Pawtu%et 1'1mv-
pike Corp., 8 R. I. 182; The People v. The Albany & Vermont Railroad Co., 
24 N. Y. 261; San Antonio Street Railway Co. v. State of Te%as, supra. 
And where the corporation desires to retain its charter the state can compe~ 
it to render service even on those parts of its system where the operation 
results in a financial loss, provided the corporate property as a whole is 
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earning a profit. Southenu Ry. Co. v. Hatchett, sttPra; State v. Postal Tele-
graph Co., 96 Kan. 298; Brownell v. Old Col_o1iy Railroad, 164 Mass. 29; 
Colorado, etc., Co. v. Railroad Commission, 54 Colo. 64 But in Ohio, appar-
ently, a corporation under a permissive charter has the right to discontinue 
any part of its service which it is not under contractual obligation to fur-
nish. Gas Co. v. City, s1tpra. See also Selectmen of Amesbury v. Citizms' 
Elec. St. Ry., 199 Mass. 394; Laighton v. City of Carthage, Mo., 175 Fed. 145. 
Ordinarily, where the discontinuance of part of the service results in a benefit 
to the public or is necessary to insure the financial success of the part 
operated, the state will take no action against the corporation. Iowa v. 
Old Colony Trust Co., 215 Fed. 307. At common law, property devoted to a 
public use could be withdrawn in any case only after reasonable notice to 
the public. I WYMAN ON Punr.1c SERVICE CORPORATIONS, § 316. Many 
states now hold that a public utility corporation has no right to discontinue 
service without dirst obtaining the consent of the state, acting through its 
Public Utilities Commission. People ex rel. Hubbard v. Colorado Title & 
Trttst Co., 65 Colo. 472; State v. Postal Telegraph Co.> g6 Kan. 2g8; Sottth-
ern Ry. Co. v. Hatchett, sitpra. The decisions of the commissions are sub-
ject to review by the courts. See cases last cited. It is also important to 
note that the right to discontinue service does not necessarily include the 
right to dismantle the plant. See R. R. Com.missio1~ of Ark. v. Saline River 
R'j.1• Co., n9 Ark. 239. Regarding the right to discontinue service, see L. 
R. A. 1915 A 549; n A. L. R. 252; 32 HARv. L. REv. 716. In N ortheru 
Illinois Light & T. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Conin. (Ill., Feb. 1922), 134 
N. E. 142, a public service corporation was engaged in operating a street 
railway and also in furnishing light and power to a city. It was held that 
where an entire street railroad system was earning a reasonable return the 
company could not discontinue service on certain of its lines, even though 
those particular lines were not yielding a profit. But the court also held 
that the profit earned on one branch of the corporate business-e. g., its 
light and power service-could not be considered in determining the right 
to discontinue service in regard to another branch of its business-e. g., its 
street railway ~ervice-when the latter was being operated at a loss. 
TRUSTS-INSURANCE TO A BENEFICIARY WITHIN PERMITTED CLASS IN 
TRUST FOR PERSON OUTSIDE Cr.Ass.-Insured took out $5,000 of insurance 
with the Bureau of War Risk Insurance in favor of his mother. He desired 
to take out another $5,ooo policy in favor of his fiancee, but was informed 
he could not name her as beneficiary. He_ thereupon took out the additional 
insurance in favor of his mother, but wrote a letter to his fiancee stating 
that his mother would pay over the money from the second policy to her. 
Held, evidence not sufficient to establish the existence of an executed trust. 
Semble, an attempt upon the part of the insured to accomplish by indirection 
what the statute forbids is illegal and unenforceable. Caessna v. Adams 
(N. J., 1921), us AtL 802. 
The decisions are conflicting in cases like the above where the insured 
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names a beneficiary within the permitted class, but charges this beneficiary 
with a trust to hold the proceeds of the policy for one outside the class. 
In Massachusetts the rule is that the next of kin, who would have been 
entitled in case no beneficiary were named, is entitled to the proceeds of the 
policy. O'Brim v. Mass. Cath. Order of Foresters, 220 Mass. 79. Kerr v. 
Crane, 212 Mass. 224 seems to decide that the intended beneficiary outside 
the class is entitled, but this is explained in the O'Brim case, supra, by the 
fact that the next of kin intervened in favor of the intended beneficiary. 
In some jurisdictions it has been held that the defense is one purely per-
sonal with the insurer. If the insurer does not object, the intended bene-
ficiary is entitled to the proceeds of the policy. Meyers v. Schumami, 54 
N. J. Eq. 414 In a suit by the intended beneficiary against the named bene-
ficiary, who agreed to hold in trust, the general rule is that the intended 
beneficiary will prevail. 40 L. R. A. (n. s.) 692, note and cases cited. But 
equity should do complete justice, and although the suit is only one between 
the intended beneficiary and the named beneficiary, the outcome should not 
be different than if all parties were joined. The prohibition against naming 
certain classes of persons as beneficiaries was adopted by the insurance com• 
pany for a purpose, and the insured assented to this when he took out the 
policy. Should not a court of equity declare that an attempt to evade this 
prohibition is void and give the proceeds of the policy to the next of kin 
or to such persons as would have been entitled if no beneficiary were named? 
WATERS AND WATER CoURsts-EFFF.cr oF DtsF.RT LAND Acr.-The Act 
of March 3, 1877, generally known as the Desert Land Act, provides for the 
sale of desert lands to persons who agree to irrigate and cultivate such lands. 
The act defines desert lands as lands which will not, without some irriga-
tion, produce crops, and provides that the Commissioner of the General 
Land Office shall determine what may be considered as such lands; it pro-
vides also that the right to the use of water on such lands shall depend 
upon appropriation, and continues as follows: "and all surplus water over 
and above such actual appropriation and use, together with the water of all 
lakes, rivers, and other sources of water supply upon the public lands * * * 
shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public 
for irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes, subject to existing 
rights." Defendants were appropriators of water from Spearfish Creek, 
· and plaintiffs (apparently since March 3, 1877) had acquired title to lands 
bordering on that stream; defendants diverted all the water in the stream 
during a dry summer, in order to satisfy their appropriations, and plaintiffs 
brought an action to determine their riparian rights. It did not appear that 
either the riparian lands of plaintiffs or the lands on which the defendants 
used the appropriated water had been obtained under the Desert Land Act. 
Held, that no riparian rights exist in connection with any public lands 
granted by the government after the passage of the Desert Land Act. Cook 
et al. v. Evans et al. (S. ·D., 1921), 185 N. W. 262. 
In a similar case in California appropriators sued to prevent the use 
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of water by upper riparian owners who had obtained title from the govern-
ment after I877. Held, that as defeE_dants' title was not obtained under the 
Desert Land Act, that act did not apply, and defendants could use the water 
as riparian owners. San J.oaquin & Kings River Canal & Irrigation Cd., 
Inc., v. Worswick et al. (Cal., I922), 203 Pac. 999. 
The opposed views of the two cases reflect the condition of the previous 
decisions on this point. In Hough v. Porter, 51 Ore. 318, which is cited in 
both cases and followed by the South Dakota court, the supreme court of 
Oregon held that all lands settled upon after March 3, 1877, "were accepted 
with the implied understanding that the first to appropriate and use the 
water for the purposes specified in the act should have the superior right 
thereto." On the other hand, the supreme court of Washington, in Sti1l v. 
Palouse Irrigation & P()wer Co., 64 Wash. 6o6, held that the provisions of 
th11 statute applied only to desert lands as defined therein, and did not apply 
to lands (or to streams thereon) title to which was obtained from the gov-
ernment under other statutes. Both decisions have been followed and 
affirmed by later cases in the same jurisdictions. There is no actual authority 
in the United States courts. Winters v. U. S., 143 Fed. 740, though some-
times cited as opposed to Hough v. Porter, .mpra, is decided on another 
ground. In Bogiwillas Land & Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 2I3 U. S. 339, the court 
finds it unnecessary to decide the question raised in the two principal cases, 
but refers to the decision in Hoitgh v. Porter, siipra, as being based on 
"plausible grounds." As to the text writers, Mr. Kinney (Sec. 8I7) criti-
cises Hough v. Porter, while Mr. Wiel (Secs. I28-I30) merely refers to the 
doctrine of that case as "a new phase of the law," and Mr. Long (Sec. 3o6) 
rather hazily inclines to Mr. Kinney's views~ It seems clear that the ques-
tion is still an open one. 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS-INJURIES RECEIVED WHILE ACTING IN 
AN EMERGENCY AS "ARISING OuT OF AND IN THE CouR.ss OF EMPLOYMENT."-
The plaintiff's intestate, employed as a gardener by the defendant company, 
was severely injured while attempting to stop a team of horses which had 
run away from the defendant's receiving platform near which he had been -
working. The team belonged to a drayman who had been delivering goods 
to the defendant company at the receiving platform, which was located 
within the latter's grounds. Held, an injury "arising out of and in the 
course of employment." Sebo v. Libby, McNeil & Libby (Mich., I92l), 185 
N. W. 702. 
The plaintiff, a chambermaid,_ after retiring to her . room in the hotel 
for the night, lighted an alcohol lamp with ~which to heat a curling iron. 
After she had finished curling her hair she left the room momentarily, and 
on returning discovered that the lamp had started a fire. In extinguishing 
the fire she was severely burned. The chambermaids had been expressly 
forbidden to use lamps like the one in question. Held, an injury "arising 
out of and in the course of employment." Kraff v. West Hotel Co. (Ia.., 
1921), 185 N. W. 895. 
RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
As to what circumstances may constitute an "emergency," see 25 HARV. 
L. REv. 416-418. The cases quite uniformly hold that a workman is still 
within the scope of his employment when, confronted with an emergency, 
he performs acts to protect his employer's property, even though such acts 
are entirely different from those included in his regularly appointed duties. 
Rees v. Thomas (1899], l Q. B. 1015 (mine worker injured while stopping 
employer's runaway horse) ; Baum v. Industrial Com., 288 Ill. 516 (factory 
employee injured in defending employer's factory against strikers); South-
em Surety Co. v. Stubbs (Tex. Civ. App.), 199 S. W. 343 (engineer injured 
while trying to save his employer's vessel from shipwreck). For a collec-
tion of cases, see note, 6 A. L. R. 1247. Recovery has been allowed where 
the employee was mistaken in his belief that danger to his employer's prop-
erty was imminent. Harriso1~ v. Whitaker Bros., 16 T. L. R. 108 (employee 
i~)ured while attempting to adjust a switch which he believed was not 
pr-0perly set for an approaching train, but which, in fact, was in good order, 
being worked automatically). The same general rule applies where an 
employee performs acts to save himself or other employees from injury for 
which the employer would be liable. Rist v. Larkili & Sangster, 156 N. Y. 
Supp. 875; U11ited States Fidelity & G. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Commission, 
174 Cal. 616; London & E. Shipping Co. v. Brown (1905], Scot. Sess. Cas. 
488. Most of the courts limit the rule to cases like the above, where the 
employee acts in furtherance of the employer's "material interests." Recov-
ery has been denied when an employee was injured while protecting his 
employer from physical injury. Clark v. Clark, 189 Mich. 652; Collins v. 
Collins [1907], 2 I. R. 104- And where an employee was injured while res-
cuing a fellow employee from the danger of an injury for which the employer 
would not have been liable. Mullm v. Stewart & Co. (1908], Scot. Sess. 
Cas. 991·. But see Ii~ re Waters v. T~ylor Co., 218 N. Y. 248, where recovery 
was allowed to the employee of one contractor who was injured while res-
cuing the employee of another contractor, both being engaged in work on 
the same building. The court based its decision on the economic and human-
itarian principles underlying the Workmen's Compensation Act and the fact 
that the act was "within the reasonable anticipation" of the employer. See 
also Priglise v. Fonda, J. & G. R. Co., 183 N. Y. Supp. 414, commented 
upon in 20 Cor.UM. L. REv. 919. There is no settled rule regarding cases 
where the employee's wrongful conduct is the cause of the emergency. In 
Hapel111a1~ v. Poole, 25 T. L. R. 155, an employee had been left in charge 
of some caged lions and in trying to drive back into its cage one tlfat had 
. escaped the employee was killed. The court in allowing recovery declared 
that whether or not the escape of the lion was due to the employee's mis-
conduct was unimportant, since wilful misconduct did not excuse the employer 
from liability where the injury resulted in death or serious and permanent 
disablement. Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, 6 Edw. VII, c. 58, sec. 
l (2) (c). In Powell v. La11arkshir.e Steel Co. (1904], Scot. Sess. Cas. 1039, 
an employee for his own pleasure, and contrary to orders, climbed into a 
car standing on a track at the top bf a steep incline. He thus set the car 
808 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
in motion, and while attempting to prevent its descent down the incline he 
suffered injuries from which he later died. The court denied relief on the 
ground that the wilful misconduct of the employee was the ultimate cause 
of the accident. The statute in that case denied recovery for all injuries 
due to the serious and wilful misconduct of the employee. Workmen's 
Compensation Act, 1897, 6o-61 Viet., c. 37, sec. l. The decision in the first 
of the principal cases, supra, is in accord with the general rule; that in the 
second seems sound in view of the fact that the Iowa statute denies relief 
for injuries due to misconduct only when the injury is due to the employee's 
intoxication or his wilful intention to injure himself or another. Compiled 
Code of Iowa, 1919, Sec. 8o8. Moreover, allowing relief even in ~ases where 
the misconduct of the employee has imperiled the employer's property will 
carry out the public policy underlying the Workmen's Compensation Acts 
and serve as an incentive to the employee to protect his employer's property. 
